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This study examines the behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors and 
discusses implications for their role in corporate governance, based on the findings of a 
questionnaire survey of fund managers carried out in 2003. Statistical analysis of the 
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institutional investors‘ behaviour contradicts their role as shareholders. 
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 11 Introduction 
The institutionalisation of shareholding has been a worldwide phenomenon 
since the 1970s. Rapid demographic ageing, one of the main reasons for this 
institutionalisation, is a problem faced by many advanced economies. But in Japan 
there was another, peculiar factor behind institutionalisation before the 1990s, namely 
cross-shareholding between financial institutions and their corporate customers.    After 
the Bubble Economy burst in the 1990s cross-shareholdings were gradually reduced, as 
the prolonged economic depression caused continuous decreases in share prices and 
damaged institutional asset values.   
Against these backdrops, institutional investors have become steadily more active 
as shareholders.  The inability of banking institutions to monitor their corporate 
borrowers since the late 1980s has raised expectations that institutional investors will 
play a key role in corporate governance.  Since the end of the 1990s, Japanese pension 
funds and trustee bodies in particular have indeed begun to voice their concerns about 
the companies in which they are long-term investors.  On  the  other hand, institutional 
investors generally have been under greater pressure from their clients to improving 
investment performance.   
    Pressure from customers to adopt short investment horizons, institutional 
restraints on risk-taking with managed funds, self-marketing and window-dressing to 
add shine to performance, portfolio pumping, portfolio churning, coordinating behaviour 
between asset managers: all these distort the behaviour of portfolio managers. Such 
biases not only decrease shareholders’ benefits in the long term but also hinder the 
ability of capital markets to evaluate corporations. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the behaviour and biases of fund managers 
working for Japanese institutional investors in these difficult circumstances, and to 
consider the implications for their corporate governance activities. The contribution of 
this study is as follows. Firstly, it throws a spotlight on the relations between 
decision-making biases in fund management and the corporate governance activities of 
institutional investors. Secondly, it examines hypotheses about behavioural biases of 
fund managers based on a questionnaire survey on fund management by Japanese 
institutional investors. This survey, which was carried out between October and 
December 2003, is the first such survey to adopt a behavioural finance approach. 
 
       This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 defines the institutional 
investors and describes heterogeneity in the fund management of institutions with 
different objectives and under different institutional restraints. Section 3 develops six 
 2hypotheses on the behavioural biases of fund managers in terms of short-sightedness, 
herding, and self-marketing.  Section 4 explains the data and examines differences in 
fund management between different types of institutions and different types of 
managed funds. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and discusses implications for 
corporate governance by institutional investors in Japan. 
 
2    Heterogeneity of fund management and behavioural biases   
2-1 Heterogeneity of Japanese institutional investors 
  Definitions of institutional investors are not uniform because objectives of and 
institutional constraints on fund management are different from country to country. 
(Davis and Steil, 2001, pp.52-63) These objectives and constraints vary according to the 
country’s legal, historical, and institutional contexts. In this study, institutional 
investors are defined as asset management companies or institutions that work for 
their customers as agents. Therefore, banking institutions are excluded. Even under 
this definition, however, behaviour of institutional investors might be heterogeneous 
due to differences in distance to the client and relations between investee companies 
and their sponsors. 
 Since the early 1980s, the share of managed funds in Japanese households’ 
assets has increased, albeit discontinuously.  As of March 2003 it accounts for about 
one third of total financial assets.  Institutional investors were diversified in the late 
1990s in the process of financial liberalization known as the Japanese Financial Big 
Bang, but can still be classified into four major types: trust banks, life insurance 
companies, investment advisory companies, and investment trust companies. These 
different types of institutional investors operate under different laws and regulations. 
In the Japanese corporate pension funds scheme, corporate pension funds entrust 
their fund management to trustee bodies, which legally can be trust banks, life 
insurance companies and investment advisory companies. Trust banks especially play 
an important role in the management of pension funds as legal shareholders of the 
companies that their customers actually invest in. With life insurance companies, 
pension funds hold insurance contracts so that the legal shareholders of the investee 
companies are naturally insurance companies. Only in the case of in-house fund 
management can the pension funds legally be shareholders, but in fact in-house fund 
management is still very limited. In pension fund management, investment advisory 
companies give instructions to trust banks on behalf of pension funds, including 
instructions on how to exercise shareholders’ rights. (Suto, 2002, pp.264-265)     
During the period of high and steady economic growth the pension funds and 
 3their trustee bodies were silent shareholders or partners of their investees. At that time 
they had neither the means nor motivation to monitor their investee companies actively.   
However, the situation changed dramatically during the prolonged economic depression 
of the 1990s.    Corporate pension funds and their trustee bodies began to recognize that 
they should play a major role in corporate governance in order to balance the retreat of 
the banking institutions. (Omura, Suto and Masuko, 2001) 
     Meanwhile, life insurance companies ran into management crises as a result of 
the stagnant stock market. Their problems were exacerbated in the late 1990s by the 
Bank of Japan’s prolonged excess low interest policy. Eight out of fourteen life insurance 
companies went bankrupt between 1997 and 2002, while others suffered from 
continuous cancellations of insurance contracts. Their problems were rooted in the 
nature of their life insurance accounts, which were divided into general accounts and 
special accounts. A general account is for policy contracts that provide a promised fixed 
return to the policy-holder and a special account is for funds managed at the customer’s 
own risk. As the investment climate worsened general accounts soon produced huge 
losses, because life insurance companies had to pay promised fixed returns to their 
policy-holders even though their returns from fund management were greatly reduced. 
Even with special accounts, fund managers have come under increasing pressure from 
their customers to improve the portfolio performance. 
 Investment trust companies supply investment trust funds with collective 
investment schemes, which are designed to invest pooled funds from a large number of 
investors into various securities and other financial assets and to pass risks on to their 
customers.  They are expected to pass on the benefits of portfolio investment to small 
investors who are not able to manage portfolios by themselves.  The typical Japanese 
investment trust fund scheme is an open-ended type of fund management which is 
tradable in the secondary market.1 Investment trust funds have boomed twice in 
postwar Japan, once in the early 1960s and again in the late 1980s. However, they 
failed to gain the trust of the general public and remain very minor financial products 
for Japanese households. In 2002, they accounted for only 2.1% of the total financial 
assets of the personal sector.   
Churning by investment trust funds as well as opaqueness of fund management 
strategies have frequently been criticized as contrary to the interests of customers. 
Their close relations with securities companies have encouraged a bias to the 
selling-side in portfolio management and thereby damaged portfolio performance.(Suto, 
                                                  
1  The Japanese investment trust funds are similar to the U.S. mutual funds but not 
company-funds but contract funds. 
 41999) In the late 1990s, investment trust funds reforms were implemented several 
times in order to increase the transparency of fund management, to reduce costs and 
fees, to lift the ban on banking institutions selling investment trust funds over the 
counter, and to widen the variety of available products.2 Nevertheless, it is true that 
many if not most investment trust fund managers still maintain high portfolio 
turnover and are not fully committed to increasing the long-term benefits to their 
customers.   
 
 
2-2 Behavioural biases in fund managers 
In terms of purpose of portfolio management, pension funds, trust banks, 
insurance companies are typically categorized as long-term investors, while investment 
trusts are categorized as short-term investors.  Previous research in the U.S. has 
shown differences in behaviour between mutual fund managers and pension fund 
managers. Mutual fund managers have a higher stock ownership turnover rate than 
pension fund managers. (Sherman, Beldona and Joshi, 1998)  Banks and insurance 
companies, which both have business relations with investee companies, are pressure 
sensitive and less able to influence the corporate management of investee companies. 
(Kochar and David, 1996)    These findings are consistent with the findings of corporate 
governance researchers that mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies are less 
active in corporate governance than pension funds. 
In Japan, not only insurance companies but also corporate pension funds were 
silent shareholders enmeshed in long-term relationships with their business partners.  
However, the prolonged economic depression of the 1990s forced them to balance these 
corporate relationships with their fiduciary responsibilities in an ageing society. 
Moreover, in 2001, sponsor companies themselves were forced to disclose pension fund 
debts. This new accounting rule has further depressed corporate profits that were 
already suffering in the economic depression.  Thus, in the defined benefit schemes, 
the pension funds have been under pressure from their sponsors as well as customers to 
adopt shorter investment horizons. A defined contribution plan was introduced in 
October 2002, but its complexity means that to date only a small number of large 
                                                  
2 As the result, new styles of investment trust funds, Exchange Trading Fund (ETF) 
and Real Estates Investment Funds (Funds), were introduced in 2003 and they 
extended the market for individual investors. 
 
 5companies have adopted it. 
Defined contribution programs have been said to greatly reduce the pressure on 
pension managers to achieve short-term results for their investments. (Sherman, 
Beldona and Joshi, 1998) In Japan, however, the pressure towards short-termism is felt 
not only by pension managers but also by insurance companies, which have suffered 
from back spread between payment of return and investment return due to a decline in 
the value of assets the 1990s. They have been in an even more severe situation than the 
pension funds. 
  To sum up, in the late 1990s, even long-term institutional investors had stronger 
incentives to shorten their investment time horizons. They were also more likely to 
adopt self-marketing tactics such as portfolio pumping, portfolio churning and so on in 
response to increased pressure from customers or sponsors.  At the same time, it is 
likely that they have been inclined to engage in herding or to use the same types of 
information so as to mitigate demands from their customers and to avoid reputation 
risk.  Confronted with myopic pressure to secure short-term gains, institutional 
investors have incentives to choose positive feedback-trading strategies, which might 
also cause herding.    Scharfsten and Stein (1990) imply that institutional investors will 
herd because they are concerned with their reputations. 
Self-marketing behaviour on the part of fund managers distorts corporate values 
and weakens the corporate governance functions of shareholders. Herding and myopic 
behaviour by institutional investors also could amplify the volatility of stock prices, 
increase market fragility, and destabilise corporate valuation. (Sias, 2004)  In the U.S. 
in the 1980s, there was a view that myopic transactions by institutional investors 
hindered the growth of long-term investment of firms and damaged technological 
innovation in the economy. (Hansen and Hill, 1991) Iihara, Kato and Tokunaga (2001) 
suggest that Japanese institutional investors follow positive feedback trading strategies 
and that investors’ trading destabilised stock prices during the period of 1975-1996.  
On the other hand, some studies note that evidence of institutional herding does not 
necessarily imply destabilisation or irrationality because institutional investors are 
better informed than individuals. (Lakonishok, Shelifer, and Vishny, 1992; Nofsinger 
and Sias, 1999) So the empirical results of the consequences of institutional herding are 
mixed. 
 We can say that pension funds and insurance companies might be more 
susceptible to pressure or intervention by both sponsors and customers in times of 
economic depression than during periods of economic growth. This susceptibility would 
render them more passive regarding corporate evaluation and shareholders activism. 
 6Their behaviour may thus become incompatible with their responsibilities for corporate 
governance as investors or shareholders. 
       
3 Hypotheses 
    In light of the above discussion, we now propose the following hypotheses to 
examine features of and differences in the fund management behaviour of Japanese 
institutional investors. We focus on forecasting time horizon of investment, information 
processing and herding, and self-marketing. We target four types of institutional 
investors: trust banks, life insurance companies, financial advisory companies, and 
investment trust companies. 
 
(1) Investment time horizon   
H 1: The forecasting time horizon of institutional investors differs depending on the 
legal and institutional restraints on their fund management.   
H2: The forecasting time horizon of fund managers of pension assets is longer than 
those of investment trust funds. 
 
(2) Information processing and herding 
    H3: Institutional investors in general follow the trend therefore they behave 
homogeneously, i.e. herd. 
H4: Institutional investors are influenced by public information therefore they 
behave homogeneously i.e. herd.   
 
(3) Self-marketing and Pressure Sensitiveness 
H5:  Institutional investors are so sensitive to pressure from customers that they 
trade too much in order to meet customers’ demands for short-term 
performance. 
H6: Institutional investors are less active and more risk averse in fund 
management than they could be in order to mitigate demand from customers 
or to avoid reputation risk.   
 
4  Methodology  
4-1 Data and Sample 
    To examine the hypotheses, we use the latest data of a questionnaire survey 
 7conducted between October and December 2003. 3 The questionnaire survey was 
organised in order to research the behaviour of fund managers of Japanese institutional 
investors in terms of incentives and information processing in portfolio management.  
Major questions in the questionnaire are classified into four parts; personal profile of 
fund managers; performance incentives; their opinions on the behaviour of asset 
managers in general; and their personal investment behaviour and information 
processing.  
The questionnaire was sent to 78 fund management companies. The return rate 
was 61.5% (48 companies); including 8 trust banks, 5 insurance companies, 29 
investment advisory companies and 6 investment trust companies.4 The total number 
of fund managers who returned the answers was 488 and average number of 
respondents per company was 10.2. 116 respondents were from trust banks, 24 from life 
insurance companies, 299 from investment advisor companies and 49 from investment 
trust companies. Among the 488 respondents, 96.7% were male, and all held bachelor or 
postgraduate degrees. They listed their current positions as follows: fund manager 
(59.5%); senior fund manager (17.9%); chief fund manager (17.5%); CIO, CEO and 
others (5.2%). 80.3% of them had been working in asset management for more than 7 
years. 
The major types of portfolio they manage are investment funds (35.8%) and 
pension funds (60.5%).  Fund managers of trust banks and life insurance companies 
concentrate on pension funds (88.6% and 62.5%), while those of investment trust 
companies concentrate on investment trust funds (90.4 %). Investment advisor 
companies are in between. (Table 1, 2) 
 
    ---Table  1--- 
    ---Table  2--- 
 
4-2 Statistical Analyses 
First, we sort the responses to the questions relevant to the six hypotheses 
developed above in order to extract a descriptive overview of behavioural features. Next, 
we examine differences in behaviour among the four types of institutional investors and 
between the two types of managed funds. We use a simple statistical method of t-value 
                                                  
3Major results of the questionnaire are summarized in Suto and Toshino (2004). 
4 We sent questionnaire to the special accounts section of life insurance companies 
because in the section the fund managers manage assets of customers. 
 8test on differences between means of two groups. 
   
(1)  Investment  time  horizon   
          In the questionnaire survey, we asked about the respondent’s personal forecasting 
horizon when making an investment decision on a scale of 1 to 6 (Days, weeks, 2-6 
months, 6-12 months, years).    Table 3 summarizes the responses by institutions and by 
funds.  49.2% of fund managers chose 2-6 months.  So we see that the average 
investment horizon is short. Further, contrary to our expectation, trust banks and life 
insurance companies, which are categorized as long-term investors, have on average 
shorter horizons than investment trust companies. It is notable that 41.7% of the fund 
managers of insurance companies have a forecasting horizon of weeks or less. They are 
speculating rather than investing.   
To confirm this descriptive analysis with statistical tests, we use a simple method 
of t-test of difference between means of two groups.  Means of forecasting horizon of 
different types of institutions and managed funds and t-values of the difference in 
means between different groups are calculated. The figures in the first column in table 4 
are differences of mean of trust banks minus the means of others, those in the second 
column are difference of the mean of life insurance companies minus the means of 
others and so on.  The results of these t-tests suggest that life insurance companies 
have a shorter time horizon from other institutions with a high statistical significance. 
But we can find no statistically significant differences between means of two types of 
funds; investment trust funds and pension assets funds.  Thus, hypothesis 1 is not 
rejected but hypothesis 2 is rejected.   
This suggests that the objectives of portfolio management do not in practice 
influence the perspective of fund managers; however, differences in institutional 
constraints on investors might be relevant to the decision–making of fund managers in 
Japan. 
---Table 3 --- 
---Table 4 --- 
 
(2)  Information Processing and Herding 
      The questionnaire asked the fund managers about their opinion on institutional 
herding in general. About 80% of respondents agree that herding does happen. On the 
other hand, about 74% of them responded negatively to the general question of whether 
“following the herd benefits the asset managers’ career”. (Suto and Toshino, 2004)   
Thus, fund managers recognize that institutional herding is a general phenomenon in 
 9the Japanese market but they do not see any connection between this and their own 
career concerns.   
     To investigate this issue further, let us examine the independence of fund 
managers’ personal decision-making by focusing on information processing. We asked 
two questions related to independence of decision-making; “I generally follow the trend” 
and “most of the published political and economic news does not surprise me at all”. The 
respondents are requested to c h o o s e  a n  a n s w e r  f r o m  c o m p l e t e  a g r e e m e n t  ( 1 )  t o  
complete disagreement (6).  Table 5 summarizes the structure of responses to the first 
question and Table 6 shows the results of t-tests among institutions and between funds. 
Table 7 and Table 8 are on the second question.   
      61.5% of fund managers agreed (1 to 3) that they generally follow the trend in 
decision-making. This suggests that they are inclined to follow the trend as a whole. 
According to the t-tests on differences between group means, investment trust 
companies follow the trend more strongly than other institutions. However, there is no 
evidence regarding the difference in portfolio objectives, so this must be due to 
institutional factors. Regarding use of published business news in decision-making, 
61.3% of fund managers are influenced by the information, although we found no 
statistical differences between institutions and between the types of managed funds.   
      Hypotheses  3  and  4  cannot  be  rejected. So we can say that the decision-making of 
fund managers is not independent from that of other fund managers, therefore they 
herd.5  
         ---Table  5--- 
         ---Table  6--- 
         ---Table  7--- 
         ---Table  8--- 
 
(3)  Self-marketing and pressure-sensitiveness 
     Next, we examine the hypotheses regarding self-marketing behaviour by fund 
managers in order to attract customers or to consider their sponsors’ financial situation 
in decision-making.  The questionnaire asked fund managers how strongly they agree 
or disagree with the statement “I often trade too much, as my clients demand 
short-term performance.” Table 9 summarizes the responses, on a scale of 1 (complete 
agreement) to 6 (complete disagreement).  The table shows that 68.1% of them give 
negative responses.    It also tells us that there is no statistical evidence of differences in 
                                                  
5  Toshino and Suto  (2004) analyze herding focusing on forecasting share prices and 
foreign exchange rates. 
 10the attitudes of fund managers due to type of institution. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that there is a statistical difference between pension 
asset funds and investment trust funds. Pension fund managers are more sensitive to 
the demands of customers than investment trust fund managers. This is because 
pension fund managers have to face their customers directly whereas investment fund 
managers do not. Therefore, pension asset management tends to be more warped 
toward frequent trading than investment fund management, even if this goes against 
the fund manager’s better personal judgement. Thus, hypothesis 5 is rejected in general 





Lastly, we investigate the influence of pressure on the risk attitude of fund 
managers in portfolio management. The questionnaire asks two questions about risk 
management; “How actively can you manage your portfolio at most?” and “How actively 
do you manage your portfolio?” The respondents are requested to choose an answer from 
very active (high tracking error) 1 to very positive 6 (indexing). (Table 11)  Average 
actual activeness is 3.03 and average of possible activeness is 2.33.  Therefore, on the 
average, the fund managers seem more risk averse in fact than they are required to be. 
According to the results of the t-tests, insurance companies are more active in actual 
investment than trust banks but we do not find any other differences between groups. 
(Table  12)    
We calculated the discrepancies between actual and possible activeness in order 
to estimate managers’ perception of institutional restraints or pressure to exercise less 
active investment. Table 13 summarizes the results of the t-test.  We have evidence 
that the mean discrepancy of trust banks is larger than the others, though the actual 
risk attitude of institutional investors has a high similarity. This suggests that the fund 
managers of trust banks themselves recognize more strongly than others the gap 
between their potential ability to undertake active investment and their actual fund 
management. We can infer that they feel stronger risk-averse pressure than other 
institutions, as most of their clients are pension funds, who demand that their portfolios 
be managed passively in defined benefit schemes. 
Where activeness in actual investment decision-making is concerned, the 
behaviour of the insurance companies is very peculiar.  The discrepancy between 
actual and possible risk attitudes of life insurance companies is as small as with 
 11investment trust companies. Additionally, the former are more active than the latter in 
reality.  The fund managers of life insurance companies manage funds as aggressively 
as they can. This might be due to the severe situation they face, as referred to above in 
the case of investment time horizon. Once again, their behaviour contradicts their 




.    
5. Discussion and conclusions. 
     Let us summarize the conclusions from our empirical analysis of Japanese 
institutional investors. Firstly, there is a general short-term bias in the investment 
forecasting of Japanese institutional investors. Secondly, institutional investors herd 
and evaluate their performance relative to each other, because they follow the trend and 
use the same published information. Thirdly, pension fund managers are more sensitive 
to pressure from their customers than investment trust fund managers, because the 
former have to face their customers directly whereas the latter do not.  Fourthly, 
institutional investors in general and trust banks in particular have a risk-aversion 
bias.    Since the introduction of disclosure for pension funds’ liabilities in 2001, pension 
fund management has become increasingly risk averse and more myopic under the 
influence of sponsors’ corporate management and financial distress. Fifthly, the 
short-term bias and excess activeness are most conspicuous in life insurance companies. 
This suggests that insurance companies are forced to achieve short-term returns in 
order to alleviate financial distress as the economy continues to stagnate. This 
behaviour contradicts their role as long-term investors. 
          Pension funds and their trustee bodies have recognized they are expected to play a 
major role as shareholders and investors to monitor the companies they invest in. 
(Omura, Suto, and Masuko, 2001) Nevertheless, this study finds evidence of some 
behavioural biases on the part of fund mangers, including short-term investment, 
herding, self-marketing, and excessive risk-aversion. Institutional investors generally 
seem to be underperforming in corporate governance, distorting corporate evaluation 
and neglecting their long-term fiduciary responsibilities. While Japanese institutional 
investors have become much more conscious of their corporate governance 
responsibilities, there is still a large gap between awareness and action.   
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 14Table 1 Structure of Respondents
Types of Institutions Number of  Number of  Number of 
  Institutions  Institutions    Respondents
to be sent Responded      （％）  
Trust Banks 9 8 88.9 116
Life Insurance Co. 10 5 50.0 24
Investment Advisory Co. 46 29 63.0 299
Investment Trust Co. 13 6 46.2 49




Table 2 Types of  Managed Funds
　　　　　(%)
Types of Institutions Investment Pension Both Others Total Number of
Trusts Assets       Responses
Trust Banks 0.0 82.8 6.0 11.2 100 116
Life Insurance Co. 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 100 24
Investment Advisory Co. 17.4 43.8 33.4 5.4 100 299
Investment Trust Co. 83.7 2.0 6.1 8.2 100 49



















 15Table 3  Personal Forecasting Time Horizon
　　　　(%)
Types of Institutions Days Weeks 　2－6 　6－12 Years  Total Number of
 Months  Months Responses
Trust Banks 4.5 17.9 57.1 16.1 4.5 100 112
Life Insurance Co. 16.7 41.7 33.3 8.3 0 100 24
Investment Advisory Co. 6.3 14.4 47.5 21.5 10.2 100 284
Investment Trust Co. 8.9 15.6 48.9 17.8 8.9 100 45
Total 6.7 16.8 49.2 19.1 8.2 100 465
Investment Trust Funds. 7.1 14.7 48.7 18.8 10.7 100 85
Pension Assets 5.7 16.1 51.7 18.7 7.8 100 236




Table 4 Difference in Forecasting Time Horizon (t- test)
Institutions Trust B. Life I.. Investment A. Means S.D. Reponses
Trust B. 2.98 0.84 112
Life I. 0.649 *** 2.33 0.87 24
3.413
Investment A. -0.166 -0.875 *** 3.15 1.00 284
-1.551 -3.867
Investment T. -0.040 -0.689 *** 0.126 3.02 1.03 45
-0.253 -2.735 0.780
Funds Managed  Investment T.F.
 Investment T.F. 3.14 1.07 85
　　
 Pension Assets 0.078 3.06 0.94 236
　 0.629
            Notes:  1 １ days, ２ weeks, 3　2-6 months, ４　6-12months、５　years.
2 Upper figures are differences in means, Lower figures are t values.











 16Table 5 Following the Trend
　　　　(%)
Types of Institutions Complete approval Complete contradiction Number of
１２ ３４５６   T o t a l Responses
Trust Banks 0.9 23.3 41.4 16.4 12.1 6.0 100.0 116
Life Insurance Co. 0.0 25.0 33.3 20.8 16.7 4.2 100.0 24
Investment Advisory Co. 1.7 27.7 31.4 16.9 16.9 5.4 100.0 296
Investment Trust Co. 10.2 34.7 20.4 20.4 12.2 2.0 100.0 49
Total 2.3 27.2 32.8 17.3 15.3 5.2 100.0 485
Investment Trust Funds. 5.4 27.2 28.3 20.7 15.2 3.3 100.0 92
Pension Assets 1.2 24.5 36.9 13.7 16.2 7.5 100.0 241




Table 6 Difference in Following the Trend (t-test)
Institutions Trust B. Life I.. Investment A. Means S.D. Reponses
Trust B. 3.34 1.16 116
Life I. -0.080 3.42 1.18 24
-0.308
Investment A. -0.022 0.059 3.36 1.25 296
-0.165 0.225
Investment T. 0.377 0.457 0.399 2.96 1.29 49
1.844 * 1.463 2.057 **
Funds Managed  Investment T.F.
 Investment T.F. 3.23 1.25 92
　
 Pension Assets -0.187
　 -1.212 3.41 1.26 241
            Notes:  1 １　complete approval.　６　complete contradiction.
2 Upper figures are differences in means, Lower figures are t values.












 17Table 7 Published Business News does not Surprise me
    　　　　(%)
Types of Institutions Complete approval Complete contradiction Number of
１２ ３４５６  Total Responses
Trust Banks 4.3 9.5 20.7 20.7 27.6 17.2 100 116
Life Insurance Co. 0.0 8.3 16.7 29.2 25.0 20.8 100.0 24
Investment Advisory Co. 5.1 10.5 22.6 24.0 21.3 16.6 100.0 296
Investment Trust Co. 8.2 10.2 22.4 14.3 26.5 18.4 100.0 49
Total 4.9 10.1 21.9 22.5 23.5 17.1 100.0 485
Investment Trust Funds. 5.4 10.9 23.9 13.0 27.2 19.6 100.0 92
Pension Assets 4.6 11.6 18.3 23.7 24.9 17.0 100.0 241




Table 8 Difference in Surprise by Publish Business News (t-test)
Institutions Trust B. Life I.. Investment A. Means S.D. Reponses
Trust B. 3.34 1.16 116
Life I. -0.239 3.42 1.18 24
-0.774
Investment A. 0.139 0.377 3.36 1.25 296
0.371 1.269
Investment T. 0.136 0.374 -0.003 2.96 1.29 49
0.551 1.031 -0.014
Funds Managed  Investment T.F.
 Investment T.F. 3.23 1.25 92
　
 Pension Assets 0.006 3.41 1.26 241
　 0.035
            Notes:  1 １　complete approval.　６　complete contradiction.
2 Upper figures are differences in means, Lower figures are t values.












 18  Table 9 Trading Too much for Clients Demand
　　　　(%)
Types of Institutions Complete approval Complete contradiction Number of
１２ ３４５６   T o t a l Responses
Trust Banks 1.7 14.7 18.1 19.8 20.7 25.0 100.0 116
Life Insurance Co. 8.7 8.7 4.3 8.7 26.1 43.5 100.0 23
Investment Advisory Co. 2.0 11.4 18.9 12.5 27.3 27.9 100.0 297
Investment Trust Co. 2.1 6.3 18.8 8.3 29.2 35.4 100.0 48
Total 2.3 11.6 18.0 13.6 25.8 28.7 100.0 484
Investment Trust Funds. 1.1 7.6 10.9 14.1 27.2 39.1 100.0 92
Pension Assets 3.3 13.8 20.0 15.8 21.7 25.4 100.0 240




Table 10 Difference in Too Much Trading for Demand of Clients 
Institutions Trust B. Life I.. Investment A. Means S.D. Reponses
Trust B. 4.18 1.45 116
Life I. -0.471 4.65 1.70 23
-1.371
Investment A. -0.173 0.299 4.35 1.45 297
-1.084 0.936
Investment T. -0.444 0.027 -0.271 4.63 1.41 48
-1.787 0.070 -1.205
Funds Managed  Investment T.F.
 Investment T.F.
　
 Pension Assets 0.611 *** 4.76 1.34 92
　 2.862 4.15 1.51 240
            Notes:  1 １　complete approval.　６　complete contradiction.
2 Upper figures are differences in means, Lower figures are t values.












 19Table 11 Attitude and strategies for active investment
    　　　　(%)
Types of Institutions Very active Very positive Number of
１２ ３４５６  Total Responses
Possibility
Trust Banks 24.1 38.8 26.7 8.6 0.0 1.7 100.0 116
Life Insurance Co. 21.7 39.1 26.1 8.7 4.3 0.0 100.0 23
Investment Advisory Co. 25.5 41.0 21.4 6.9 3.1 2.1 100.0 290
Investment Trust Co. 21.3 27.7 23.4 10.6 6.4 10.6 100.0 47
Total 24.6 39.1 23.1 7.8 2.7 2.7 100.0 476
In fact
Trust Banks 5.3 21.9 39.5 23.7 6.1 3.5 100.0 114
Life Insurance Co. 17.4 30.4 26.1 17.4 8.7 0.0 100.0 23
Investment Advisory Co. 6.6 21.4 47.9 16.2 6.6 1.4 100.0 290
Investment Trust Co. 2.1 31.9 38.3 12.8 4.3 10.6 100.0 47




Table 12 Difference in Actual Activeness of Fund Management-test)
Institutions Trust B. Life I.. Investment A. Means S.D. Reponses
Trust B. 3.14 0.91 114
Life I. 0.445 * 2.70 1.38 23
1.942
Investment A. 0.151 -0.294 2.99 1.11 290
1.289 -1.200
Investment T. -0.030 -0.475 -0.181 3.17 1.57 47
-0.151 -1.234 -0.970
Funds Managed  Investment T.F.
 Investment T.F. 2.54 1.47 89
　
 Pension Assets 0.151 2.39 1.05 237
　 1.031
            Notes:  1 １　complete approval.　６　complete contradictions.
2 Upper figures are differences in means, Lower figures are t values.










 20Table 13 Differences in the Gaps between Actual and Possible Activeness  (t-test)
Institutions Trust B. Life I.. Investment A. Means S.D. Reponses
Trust B. 0.88 1.01 114
Life I. 0.529 *** 0.35 0.71 23
2.402
Investment A. 0.159 -0.370 * 0.72 0.95 287
1.466 -1.819
Investment T. 0.558 *** 0.029 0.399 *** 0.32 0.81 47
3.238 0.144 2.709
Funds Managed  Investment T.F.
 Investment T.F. 0.57 0.85 89
　
 Pension Assets -0.192 0.76 0.96 234
　 -1.656
            Notes:  1 １　complete approval.　６　complete contradiction.
2 Upper figures are differences in means, Lower figures are t values.
Level of significance, ***1%　**5%　*10%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21